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How Can a Prison Inmate Challenge
the Procedures for Carrying Out
His Imminent Execution?

C

by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 334-337. ©2004 American Bar Association.

The Supreme Court is
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asked to determine
whether a death row
inmate's complaint
brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and seeking to
stay the inmate's execution in order to pursue a
challenge to the procedures for carrying out the
execution was properly
characterized as a habeas
corpus petition filed in
violation of the rules
regarding second or
successive habeas
petitions.
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Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377. Prof. Grenig is
the co-author of West's Federal
Jury Practice and Instructions
(5th edition).

ISSUE
Is a prison inmate's complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
the "functional equivalent" of a second or successive habeas corpus
petition subject to the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 if the complaint
asks for a stay of execution?
FACTS
David Larry Nelson killed two men,
James Cash and Wilson Thompson,
the night of December 31, 1977.
He killed Cash while in the course
of robbing him. He shot Thompson
in the back of the head after
arranging for Thompson to have
sex with his female companion in
Thompson's trailer home. Nelson
also shot and seriously wounded his
female companion.

tenced to death. Both convictions
were reversed by the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals and the
Alabama Supreme Court, pursuant
to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980). See Nelson v. State, 405
So.2d 50 (Ala.Crim.App.1981);
Nelson v. State, 405 So.2d 401
(Ala.1981).
Nelson was retried for the Cash
murder and again found guilty. He
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Nelson was also retried and found
guilty of the murder of Thompson,
but for that crime he was sentenced
to death. The Thompson conviction
was upheld by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals and the Alabama
Supreme Court. Nelson v. State,
511 So. 2d 225 (Ala.Crim.App.
1986), afftd, 511 So.2d 248 (Ala.
1987). The U.S. Supreme Court
denied Nelson's petition for certiorari. Nelson v. Alabama, 486 U.S.
1017 (1988).
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He was indicted in separate indictments for the two killings. He was
first tried for the murder of Cash
and convicted and sentenced to
death. See Nelson v. State, 405
So.2d 392 (Ala.Crim.App.1980). In
October 1978, he was tried for the
Thompson murder and again sen-

DOCKET No. 03-6821
ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 29, 2004
FROM: THE ELEVENTH CIRCMT

In December 1990, Nelson filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama. The
district court denied the petition
with respect to Nelson's guilt but
granted it with respect to his death
sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549,
1558 (11th Cir. 1993).
A new sentencing hearing was conducted in 1994. Nelson represented
himself in the proceeding for a jury.
In his closing argument, Nelson
asked the judge and jury to sentence him to death. The jury
returned a recommendation that
Nelson receive the death penalty,
and the judge sentenced him to
death.
In April 1997, Nelson petitioned the
U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama for a writ of
habeas corpus under 29 U.S.C. §
2254. The district court denied
relief. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. Nelson v. Alabama, 292
F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2002).
Until April 1, 2002, the sole method
of carrying out death sentences in
Alabama was by electrocution. On
July 1, 2002, the Alabama legislature
changed the mode of execution from
electrocution to lethal injection. On
September 3, 2003, the Alabama
Supreme Court scheduled Nelson's
execution by lethal injection for
October 9, 2003. On Friday, October
3, 2003, the prison warden notified
Nelson that the medical procedure
that would be used to gain venous
access before the lethal injection
procedure would require a two-inch
incision either in Nelson's leg or
arm, with only a local anesthetic
being used. The warden also
informed Nelson that instead of
being performed 24 hours before the
execution, the procedure would
begin one hour before the execution.

On October 6, 2003, three days
before his scheduled execution,
Nelson filed a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Nelson asserted that he has
severely compromised veins
because of his history of intravenous drug use and that Alabama's
proposed use of a "cut-down" procedure to gain venous access (if access
to a suitable vein cannot be
achieved) as part of the lethal injection procedure constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. He alleged that the
procedure the defendants had proposed for accessing his veins is cruel and unusual. He is not asking that
the courts permanently stop his
execution, only that the lethal injection be delayed until he is assured
that a safe, medically acceptable
procedure will be used to gain
access to his veins.
The U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama held that
Nelson's § 1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a habeas corpus
petition and thus was subject to limits imposed on successive petitions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Nelson v.
Campbell, 286 F.Supp.2d 1321
(M.D.Ala.2003). The district court
explained that a § 1983 action seeking a stay of execution must be
treated as a habeas petition for purposes of the prohibition on second
or successive habeas petitions. The
district court acknowledged that
"[i]t would seem that there should
be a process by which Nelson can
seek enforcement of his Eighth
Amendment Rights. However,
Eleventh Circuit law is clear that
such a stay can be obtained through
only habeas relief-relief which is
now foreclosed."
Affirming the district court, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that Nelson's § 1983

claim constituted the "functional
equivalent" of a second or successive habeas petition as it sought an
immediate stay of the imposition of
Nelson's death sentence. Through
his counsel, Nelson acknowledged
that he had exhausted all available
habeas corpus relief and that he
would have to obtain permission
from the Eleventh Circuit in order
to file a second or successive habeas
petition. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Nelson's request to stay
his execution directly impeded the
implementation of the state sentence and was indicative of an effort
to accomplish via § 1983 that which
cannot be accomplished by a successive petition for habeas corpus.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that
Nelson was not entitled to file a second habeas petition. His claim did
not rely on a new rule of constitutional law. Nor did it possess a factual predicate that (1) could not
have been discovered previously
and (2) would have been sufficient
to establish that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found him guilty of
the underlying offense.
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Wilson
contended that a complaint seeking
§ 1983 relief in the form of a temporary stay of execution is not automatically equivalent to a successive
habeas petition. He stated that
before making the determination of
whether the § 1983 proceeding
should be considered a habeas petition or a civil rights action, a court
must inquire into the fundamental
question of whether the plaintiff is
actually seeking to challenge either
the fact of his conviction or the sentence. If Nelson's action, even if successful, would not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against him, Judge
Wilson asserted, the § 1983 action
should be allowed to proceed in
(Continued on Page 336)
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the absence of some other bar to
the suit.
The Supreme Court granted
Nelson's petition for a writ of certiorari. 124 S.Ct. 383 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 provides a remedy for vindicating violations of all rights, privileges, and immunities secured by
law. To state a claim under § 1983,
the plaintiff must establish two
essential elements: (1) that there
was a violation of a right "secured
by the Constitution or laws of the
United States," and (2) that the person who committed the alleged violation was "acting under color of
state law."
The treatment an inmate receives in
prison and the conditions under
which an inmate are confined are
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments." Those
confined within penal institutions
cannot be subjected to cruel and
unusual punishments by reason of
offensive practices.
The writ of habeas corpus provides
a means by which the legal authority under which a person is detained
can be challenged. A writ of habeas
corpus may be used to re-examine
federal constitutional issues even
after trial and review by the state
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953). By means of a writ of
habeas corpus, a federal court may
order the discharge of any person
held by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Congress made a number of important changes to the habeas corpus
statutes in 1996 as part of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. Although the
requirement of exhaustion of state

remedies was preserved, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b) was amended to provide a
limit on second or successive applications by inmates in state custody.
Under this provision, a claim presented in a second or successive
application that was presented in an
earlier application will be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
Moreover, even if the claim in a second or successive application was
not presented in a previous application, it will still be dismissed unless
the applicant shows that the claim
relies on a new and previously
unavailable rule of constitutional
law made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme
Court. Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts
provides: "A second or successive
petition may be dismissed if the
judge finds that it fails to allege new
or different grounds for relief and
the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different
grounds are alleged, the judge finds
that the failure to assert those
grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ."
The Eleventh Circuit's rule that a §
1983 action seeking a stay of execution must be treated as a habeas
petition distinguishes between death
row inmates whose execution dates
are imminent and those whose
dates are not. In Bradley v. Pryor,
305 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002), the
Eleventh Circuit allowed a death
row inmate's § 1983 action that did
not include a request for a stay of
execution because a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would not "necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction." See Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Nelson argues that serious constitutional issues may emerge concerning the procedures for executing an
individual after that inmate's federal

habeas corpus proceedings have
been completed. According to
Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit's failure to provide any remedy for
Eighth Amendment violations in
these unusual situations would
offend longstanding traditions of justice and raise grave constitutional
questions that can readily be avoided by a proper interpretation of federal statutes. Nelson reasons that
Congress enacted § 2244(b) to prevent state prisoners from using federal habeas corpus proceedings to
attack their convictions or their
sentences repetitiously or dilatorily.
He claims that the Eleventh Circuit
has converted § 2244(b) into a bar
against the provision of any federal
forum to a state inmate who is not
attacking either a conviction or a
sentence, but is seeking one-and
only one-opportunity to present an
Eighth Amendment claim of needless cruelty at the first opportunity
after learning that a state prison
official has decided to execute the
sentence in a wantonly torturous
manner.
Nelson relies on Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637
(1998), in which the Supreme Court
held that a federal habeas corpus
petition presenting claims arising in
the first instance out of the circumstances of a death row inmate's
imminent execution-claims that
were premature and unfit for adjudication until just before the execution was carried out-is not a second or successive petition for purposes of § 2244(b) when they are
filed by an inmate who has earlier
litigated and lost a habeas corpus
proceeding raising claims that challenged the validity of the underlying
conviction and sentence.
Under a proper construction of 28
U.S.C. § 1983, Nelson contends, a
federal court does not invariably
lose jurisdiction to entertain an otherwise cognizable § 1983 action

Issue No. 6

simply because the inmate has previously sought federal habeas corpus
relief on unrelated grounds.
According to Nelson, the Eleventh
Circuit's rule allowing no exceptions
in the case of prisoners whose
claims in the later legal action could
not have been presented in their
earlier habeas corpus proceeding
means that claims of this kind
cannot be raised at all in the
Eleventh Circuit because, by
definition, they are always either
too early or too late.
According to Nelson, when a previously unavailable claim that does
not invalidate a conviction or sentence is otherwise cognizable under
§ 1983, a federal court is not jurisdictionally barred from reviewing
the claim simply because the
claimant is an inmate who has completed federal habeas corpus proceedings. Nelson points out that the
Supreme Court in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
recognized that state prisoners
may seek redress under § 1983
if a judgment in the prisoner's
favor would not "necessarily imply"
the invalidity of his or her conviction or sentence.
Relying on Preiserv. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973), Campbell
asserts that Nelson's claim is not
cognizable under § 1983 because it
directly challenges the imposition of
his death sentence. In Preiser,the
Supreme Court stated that the fact
that "[tlhe broad language of §
1983" covers a prisoner-plaintiffs
request for equitable relief is "not
conclusive"; the "specific federal
habeas corpus statute" is the exclusive remedy when it "clearly
applies." By challenging a procedure
that is a "condition precedent" to
the imposition of his death sentence, Campbell contends, Nelson is
challenging the sentence itself.
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Campbell argues that the relief
sought by Nelson-a stay of his
impending execution-is not
available under § 1983. According
to Campbell, federal courts lack
jurisdiction under § 1983 to stay
executions.
If recharacterization of his § 1983
complaint is proper, Nelson says
that the complaint should be entertained as a federal habeas corpus
petition by the district court with
no need for prior authorization by
the court of appeals because it is
not a second or successive habeas
corpus application within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Nelson
stresses that his claim could not
have been presented in his previously federal habeas corpus proceeding because it was premature
when that proceeding was maintained and finally adjudicated.
SIGNIFICANCE
If the Supreme Court upholds the
dismissal of Nelson's lawsuit, he will
effectively be left without a federal
forum for reviewing his Eighth
Amendment claim. If a § 1983
action seeking a stay of execution
must be treated as a habeas petition, this means that after a death
row inmate has filed his first federal
habeas petition, the inmate can
probably never obtain a stay of execution from a federal court that
would enable that court to review
an Eighth Amendment claim regarding any later decision as to how the
execution will be carried out.
On the other hand, if the Supreme
Court reverses the Eleventh
Circuit, inmates could still raise
constitutional challenges to the
means of execution despite having
previously filed habeas corpus
petitions. Inmates would still be
restricted from filing successive
actions challenging their sentences
or convictions.
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